Palestinian political violence refers to acts of violence undertaken to further the Palestinian cause. These political objectives include self-determination in and sovereignty over Palestine,[1][2] the liberation of Palestine and establishment of a Palestinian state, either in place of both Israel and the Palestinian territories or solely in the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories[3][4][5] Periodically directed toward more limited goals such as the release of Palestinian prisoners, another key aim is to advance the Palestinian right of return.[6]
Palestinian groups that have carried out or support politically-motivated violent acts have included Hamas, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Abu Nidal Organization.[7] Violent tactics varied, and included plane hijackings, stone throwing, stabbing, shootings, and bombings.[8]
Palestinian political violence has targeted Israelis, Palestinians, Jordanians,[9] Egyptians[10] and citizens of other countries.[11] Israeli statistics state that 3,500 Israelis[11][12] have been killed and 25,000 have been wounded as a result of Palestinian violence since the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. These figures include soldiers as well as civilians, including those killed in exchanges of gunfire.[13][14]
Incidents included the riots of April, 1920, the riots in Palestine of May, 1921, the 1929 Hebron massacre and Safed massacre, and the 1936-1939 Arab revolt in Palestine. Prominent leaders of the Palestinian groups were Sheikh Izz ad-Din al-Qassam, who was killed by the British army, and the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Haj Amin Al-Husseini, who fled the country.
According to an article in FrontPage Magazine "From 1949 to 1956, Egypt waged a terror war against Israel, launching c. 9,000 attacks from cells set up in the refugee camps of the Gaza Strip.".[15] Around 400 Palestinian infiltrators were killed by Israeli Security Forces each year in 1951, 1952 and 1953; a similar number and probably far more were killed in 1950. 1,000 or more were killed in 1949. At least 100 were killed during 1954–6. In total upward of 2,700 and possibly as many as 5,000 infiltrators were killed by the IDF, police, and civilians along Israel's borders between 1949 and 1956. In all probability the majority of those killed were unarmed 'economic' and social infiltrators.[16]
Throughout the period 1949–56 the Egyptian government opposed the movement of refugees from the Gaza strip into Israel, but following the IDF's Gaza Raid on 28 February 1955 the Egyptian authorities facilitated terrorist infiltration but still continued to oppose civilian infiltration.[17] At first, Palestinians were trying to go back to their houses or to retrieve property but after 1950 these acts became much more violent and included killings of civilians in nearby cities.
After Israel's Operation Black Arrow in 1955 which came as a result of a series of massacres in the city of Rehovot, the Palestinian fedayeen were incorporated into an Egyptian unit.[18] John Bagot Glubb, a high-ranking British army general who worked with the Arab Legion, explained in his autobiographical history of the period how he convinced the Legion to arm and train the fedayeen for free.[19] The Israeli government cites dozens of these attacks as "Major Arab Terrorist Attacks against Israelis prior to the 1967 Six-Day War".[20][21] Between 1951 and 1956, 400 Israelis were killed and 900 wounded by fedayeen attacks.;[22][23] according to the Anti-Defamation League "[i]n 1955 alone, 260 Israeli citizens were killed or wounded by fedayeen".[24]
| “ | Our basic aim is to liberate the land from the Mediterranean Seas to the Jordan River. We are not concerned with what took place in June 1967 or in eliminating the the consequences of the June war. The Palestinian revolution's basic concern is the uprooting of the Zionist entity from our land and liberating it. | ” |
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—Yasser Arafat, 1970[25] |
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The Palestine Liberation Organization was founded in 1964. At its first convention in Cairo, hundreds of Palestinians met to, "call for the right of self-determination and the upholding of the rights of the Palestinian nation."[26] In order to achieve these goals, a Palestinian army of liberation was thought to be essential; thus, the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) was established with the support of the Arab states.[26] Fatah, a Palestinian group founded in the late 1950s to organize the armed resistance against Israel, and headed by Yasser Arafat, soon rose to prominence within the PLO. The PLO charter called for, "an end to the State of Israel, a return of Palestinians to their homeland, and the establishment of a single democratic state throughout Palestine."[27] After the 1967 war, Palestinians realized that reliance on the Arab states would lead nowhere and that only they could liberate their homeland, which led to the emergence of many more Palestinian guerrilla factions, who took up armed struggle as a primary means of achieving their goals.[27]
In the wake of the Six-Day War, confrontations between Palestinian guerrillas in Jordan and government forces became a major problem within the kingdom. By early 1970, at least seven Palestinian guerrilla organizations were active in Jordan, one of the most important being the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) led by George Habash. Based in the Jordanian refugee camps, the fedayeen developed a virtual state within a state, receiving funds and arms from both the Arab states and Eastern Europe and openly flouting the law of the country. The guerrillas initially focused on attacking Israel, but by late 1968, the main fedayeen activities in Jordan appeared to shift to attempts to overthrow the Jordanian monarchy.[9]
Various clashes between the fedayeen and the army occurred between the years 1968–1970. The situation climaxed in September 1970, when several attempts to assassinate king Hussein failed. On September 7, 1970, in the series of Dawson's Field hijackings, three planes were hijacked by PFLP: a SwissAir and a TWA that were landed in Azraq area and a Pan Am that was landed in Cairo. Then on September 9, a BOAC flight from Bahrain was also hijacked to Zarqa. The PFLP announced that the hijackings were intended "to pay special attention to the Palestinian problem". After all hostages were removed, the planes were dramatically blown up in front of TV cameras.
A bitterly fought 10-day civil war known as Black September ensued, drawing involvement by Syria and Iraq, and sparking troop movements by Israel and the United States Navy. The number of fighters killed on all sides were estimated as high as 3,500.[9]
Battles between Palestinian guerrilla forces and the Jordanian army continued during the closing months of 1970 and the first six months of 1971. In November 1971, members of the Palestinian Black September group, who took their name from the civil war, assassinated Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal in Cairo. In December the group made an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate the Jordanian ambassador in Britain.[9]
In the aftermath of Black September in Jordan, many Palestinians arrived in Lebanon, among them Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). In the early 1970s their presence exacerbated an already tense situation in Lebanon, and in 1975 the Lebanese Civil War broke out. Beginning with street fighting in Beirut between Christian Phalangists and Palestinian militiamen, the war quickly deteriorated into a conflict between two loosely defined factions: the side wishing to preserve the status quo, consisting primarily of Maronite militias, and the side seeking change, which included a variety of militias from leftist organizations and guerrillas from rejectionist Palestinian (nonmainstream PLO) organizations. The Lebanese civil war lasted until 1990 and resulted in an estimated 130,000 to 250,000 civilian fatalities and one million wounded.[28]
After Black September, the PLO and its offshoots waged an international campaign against the Israeli state. Notable events were the Munich Olympics massacre (1972) , the hijacking of several civilian airliners (some were thwarted, see for example: Entebbe Operation), the Savoy Hotel attack, the Zion Square explosive refrigerator and the Coastal Road massacre. During the 1970s and the early 1980s, Israel suffered attacks from PLO bases in Lebanon, such as the Avivim school bus massacre in 1970, the Maalot massacre in 1974 (where Palestinian terrorists massacred 21 school children) and the attack led by Samir Kuntar in 1979. Following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, called "Operation Peace for Galilee" by the IDF, and the exile of the PLO to Tunis, Israel had a relatively quiet decade.
The First Intifada was characterized more by grassroots and non-violent political actions from among the population in the Israeli occupied Palestinian territories.[29] A total of 160 Israelis and 1,100 Palestinians were killed over its five years, which ended with the signing of the Oslo Accords.[30] The strategy of non-violence, though widespread among Palestinians, was not always adhered to, and there were youth who threw molotov cocktails and stones, with such violence generally directed against Israeli soldiers and settlers.[31]
There were two attacks that represented new developments in terms of political violence inside Israel in this period. The first Palestinian suicide attack took place on 6 July 1989 when a member of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad boarded the Tel Aviv Jerusalem bus 405. He walked up to the driver and pulled the wheel to the right, driving the vehicle into an abyss, killing 16 people.[32] The end of the intifada also saw the first use of suicide bombing as a tactic by Palestinian militants. On 16 April 1993, Hamas carried out the Mehola Junction bombing, in which operative Saher Tamam al-Nabulsi detonated his explosives-laden car between two buses. One person, a Palestinian, other than the attacker was killed, and 21 were wounded.[33]
The years between the intifadas were marked by intense diplomatic activity between Israel and Palestinians as well as the creation of the Palestinian National Authority. In this period, suicide bombings of Israeli buses and crowded spaces as a regular tactic, particularly by Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Attacks during this period include the Beit Lid massacre, a double-suicide bombing at a crowded junction that killed 21 people,[34] and the Dizengoff Center massacre, a suicide bombing outside a Tel Aviv shopping mall that killed 13 people.
According to B'Tselem, as of 10 July 2005, over 400 members of the Israeli Security forces, and 821 Israeli civilians have been killed by Palestinians since the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, 553 of whom were killed within the 1949 Armistice lines, mainly by suicide bombings. Targets of attacks included buses, IDF checkpoints, restaurants, discothèques, shopping malls, a university, and civilian homes.[35][36][37] During the Second Intifada alone 1,137 Israelis were killed by Palestinians, according to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (counted since 29 September 2000, retrieved at 26 December 2007 [38]).
In October 2000 a Palestinian mob lynched two non-combatant Israel Defense Forces reservists, Vadim Nurzhitz (sometimes spelled as Norzhich) and Yossi Avrahami (or Yosef Avrahami),[39] who had accidentally entered the Palestinian Authority-controlled city of Ramallah in the West Bank. The brutality of the event, captured in a photo of a Palestinian rioter proudly waving his blood-stained hands to the crowd below, sparked international outrage and further intensified the ongoing conflict between Israeli and Palestinian forces.[40][41][42][43]
A spate of suicide bombings and attacks, aimed mostly at civilians (such as the Dolphinarium discotheque suicide bombing), was launched against Israel and elicited a military response. A suicide bombing dubbed the Passover Massacre (30 Israeli civilians were killed at Park hotel, Netanya) climaxed a bloody month of March 2002, in which more than 130 Israelis, mostly civilians, were killed in attacks. Israel launched Operation Defensive Shield. The operation led to the apprehension of many members of militant groups, as well as their weaponry and equipment.
In 2004, 31 people were killed and 159 others were wounded in a simultaneous attack against multiple tourist destinations in Egypt.[44] Of the dead, 15 were Egyptians, 12 were from Israel, two from Italy, one from Russia, and one was an Israeli-American. According to the Egyptian government, the bombers were Palestinians led by Iyad Saleh who had tried to enter Israel to carry out attacks there but were unsuccessful.[45]
In the mid 2000s Hamas started putting greater emphasis on its political characteristics and strengthened its popularity amongst Palestinians. In 2006 Palestinian legislative elections Hamas won a majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council, prompting the United States and many European countries to cut off all funds to the Hamas and the Palestinian Authority,[46] insisting that the Hamas must recognize Israel, renounce violence and accept previous peace pacts.[47]
After the Israel's unilateral disengagement plan in 2005 and the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections Hamas took control over all the Gaza Strip in June 2007 in a bloody coup. The Hamas rule in the Gaza strip increased the firing of Qassam rockets, mortars and Grad missiles on the Israeli villages located nearby the Gaza strip, Sderot and Ashkelon and led to the armament of the Hamas in the Gaza strip with the funds and assistance of Iran. At the same time, attack attempts continued outside the Gaza strip perimeter, including the well-planned kidnapping operation of the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit.
Hamas has made great use of guerrilla tactics in the Gaza Strip and to a lesser degree the West Bank.[48] Hamas has successfully adapted these techniques over the years since its inception. According to a 2006 report by rival Fatah party, Hamas had smuggled "between several hundred and 1,300 tons" of advanced rockets, along with other weaponry, into Gaza. Some Israelis and some Gazans both noted similarities in Hamas's military buildup to that of Hezbollah in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war.[48]
Hamas has used IEDs and anti-tank rockets against the IDF in Gaza. The latter include standard RPG-7 warheads and home-made rockets such as the Al-Bana, Al-Batar and Al-Yasin. The IDF has a difficult, if not impossible time trying to find hidden weapons caches in Palestinian areas — this is due to the high local support base Hamas enjoys.[49]
Some allege that the Palestinian Authority (PA) does not do enough to prevent attacks, or to reduce Palestinian public support for acts of violence. Some accuse the PA of sponsoring groups that carry out acts of violence, such as Fatah's Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, and of using the official PA television, radio, press, and education system to facilitate attacks upon Israel. Palestinians assert that it is not realistic to expect the kind of control Israel demands from the PA to curtail these groups, as the PA does not have actual control of most cities or adequate law-enforcement resources, and has suffered severe infrastructural damage to much of its security apparatus during confrontations with the Israel Defense Force.
Saddam Hussein, the leader of Iraq, donated $25,000 to the families of suicide bombers, and $10,000 to the families of Palestinian civilians killed by the Israeli military.[50]
In the 1930s, the emergence of organized youth cadres was rooted in the desire to form a youth paramilitary along German and Italian Fascist lines. It was believed that armed youth might bring an end to British hegemony in the Middle East as well as the very existence of Jewry. Youth were cajoled into violence by Palestinian political figures and newspapers that glorified violence and death. The Palestinian Arab Party sponsored the development of storm troops consisting solely of children and youth patterned on the German model. A British report from the period stated that "the growing youth and scout movements must be regarded as the most probable factors for the disturbance of the peace".[51]
As a youngster, Yasir Arafat led neighborhood children in marching and drills, beating those who did not obey. In the 1940s, Arafat's father organized a group of militants in Gaza which included Yasir Arafat and his brothers. The leader, Abu Khalid, a mathematics teacher in Gaza, gave Arafat the name Yasir in honor of the militant Yasir al-Bireh.[52]
According to researcher Vamik Volkan, most suicide bombers in the Middle East are chosen as teenagers, educated, and then sent off blow themselves up when they are in their late teens or early to mid-twenties.[53]
There have been instances where Palestinian children were involved in attacks, either as child suicide bombers or bomb transporters. On 16 March 2005, an Israeli border guard found a bomb in the school bag of 12-year-old Abdullah Quran at a military checkpoint near Nablus. His life was saved only because a cell phone rigged to detonate the 13-pound bomb failed to set off the explosive at the checkpoint as it had been designed to do. Eight days later, on March 24, 16-year-old Hussam Abdo was captured wearing an explosive belt, having allegedly been paid by Fatah's Tanzim branch to blow himself up at the same checkpoint. According to the Israel Defense Forces, from September 2000 through 2003, 29 suicide attacks have been carried out by youth under the age of 18, and, more than 40 youths under the age of 18 were involved in attempted suicide bombings that were thwarted.
The "male-militancy path" has met with greater social acceptance in Palestinian society than the "female/grassroots path". Women in particular have increasingly associated political violence with expanded citizenship rights due to the perceived failure of nonmilitaristic tactics to achieve political goals, primary amongst these, the achievement of Palestinian autonomy.[54]
The profile of the female Palestinian suicide bombers has been the subject of study by Katherine VanderKaay, who presented her profiling of the subjects at the American Psychological Association's annual meeting. While the first suicide bombing undertaken by a Palestinian took place in 1994, the first female suicide bomber from among Palestinian society did not emerge until January 2002. The bomber was Wafa Idris, a paramedic, reported to be 28, secular, Westernised and only nominally religious.[55][56]
According to B'Tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, 496 Israeli civilians were killed by Palestinians from 29.9.2000 to 31.7.2010 in Israel, and another 242 Israeli civilians were killed in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.[57]
B'tselem reported that the main argument used to justify violence against civilians is that "all means are legitimate in fighting for independence against a foreign occupation". B'Tselem criticized this argument, saying it is completely baseless, and contradicts the fundamental principle of international humanitarian law.
"According to this principle, civilians are to be protected from the consequences of warfare , and any attack must discriminate between civilians and military targets. This principle is part of international customary law; as such, it applies to every state, organization, and person, even those who are not party to any relevant convention."[58]
B'Tselem further noted that Palestinian spokespersons distinguish between attacks inside Israel proper and attacks directed at settlers in the Occupied Territories, stating that since the settlements are illegal and many settlers belong to Israel's security forces, settlers are not entitled to the international law protections granted to civilians. Human rights group B'tselem rejected this argument, and stated:
"The illegality of the settlements has no effect at all on the status of their civilian residents. The settlers constitute a distinctly civilian population, which is entitled to all the protections granted civilians by international law. The Israeli security forces' use of land in the settlements or the membership of some settlers in the Israeli security forces does not affect the status of the other residents living among them, and certainly does not make them proper targets of attack. B'Tselem strongly opposes the attempts to justify attacks against Israeli civilians by using distorted interpretations of international law. Furthermore, B'Tselem demands that the Palestinian Authority do everything within its power to prevent future attacks and to prosecute the individuals involved in past attacks."[58]
B'Tselem reports that from 2000 to 2010 there were 664 Palestinians killed by Palestinians. Of those, 134 were killed for suspected collaboration with Israel.[11][59]
Concerning the killing of Palestinians by other Palestinians, a January 2003 Humanist magazine article reports:[60]
For over a decade the PA has violated Palestinian human rights and civil liberties by routinely killing civilians—including collaborators, demonstrators, journalists, and others—without charge or fair trial. Of the total number of Palestinian civilians killed during this period by both Israeli and Palestinian security forces, 16 percent were the victims of Palestinian security forces. ...According to Freedom House's annual survey of political rights and civil liberties, Freedom in the World 2001–2002, the chaotic nature of the Intifada along with strong Israeli reprisals has resulted in a deterioration of living conditions for Palestinians in Israeli-administered areas. The survey states: "Civil liberties declined due to: shooting deaths of Palestinian civilians by Palestinian security personnel; the summary trial and executions of alleged collaborators by the Palestinian Authority (PA); extra-judicial killings of suspected collaborators by militias; and the apparent official encouragement of Palestinian youth to confront Israeli soldiers, thus placing them directly in harm's way."
Internal Palestinian violence has been called an Intrafada.[61]
The United States[62] and European Union[63] have designated the Abu Nidal Organisation, Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Palestine Liberation Front, the PFLP and PFLP-GC as terrorist organisations. A United States Congress decision from 1987 also described the PLO as a terrorist organization[64]
The military wing of Hamas is also recognized as a terrorist organization by Israel,[65] Canada,[66][67] Germany,[68] Japan,[69] Jordan,[70] the United Kingdom[71] and Australia.[72]
A study conducted by Mkhaimer Abusada of Al-Azhar University explored attitudes towards the use of political violence. Four questions were posed on the subject of political violence to over a thousand respondents randomly selected from localities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The first question was: "Do you support the continuing resort of some Palestinian factions to armed operations against Israeli targets in Gaza and Jericho?" Overall, 56% of respondents responded negatively. Those affiliated with leftist groups showed the highest levels of support for armed attacks against Israelis (74%), while those affiliated with parties supporting the peace process showed the lowest levels (24%). The Islamic opposition was split, with slightly over half in favor, and slightly less than half opposed.[73]
In September 1995, survey participants were asked whether they supported, opposed or had no opinion with regard to "armed attacks against Israeli army targets," "armed attacks against Israeli settlers," and "armed attacks against Israeli civilian targets." The majority supported the use of armed attacks against Israeli military targets and settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Support crossed all party lines and groups, and was highest among the Islamic opposition (91% and 84%) and the leftists (90% and 89%), though a significant majority of those who supported the peace process also supported armed attacks on military targets and settlers (69% and 73%). To explain the apparent paradox in the latter position, Abusada quotes Shikaki (1996) who, "contends that Palestinian support for the use of armed attacks against Israeli military targets and settlers does not indicate 'opposition to the peace process but Palestinian insistence that the process entails an end to occupation and settlements.'"[73] Palestinian support for armed attacks against Israeli civilian targets in Israel was 20% overall, with support being highest among those affiliated with the Islamic opposition (42%) and the leftists (32%), and lowest among supporters of the peace process (12%) and the National Independents (10%).[73]
A July 2001 poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy & Survey Research (PSR) found that 58 percent of Palestinians supported armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel and 92 percent supported armed confrontations against the Israeli army in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.[74] A May 2002 poll by the center found that support for bombings of civilians inside Israel dropped to 52 percent, but support for armed attacks against Israeli settlers remained "very high" at 89 percent. Support for armed attacks against soldiers stood at 92 percent.[75] A poll after the 2003 Maxim restaurant suicide bombing, in which 20 Israelis were killed, found that 75 percent of Palestinians supported the attack, with support higher, "in the Gaza Strip (82%) compared to the West Bank (70%), in refugee camps (84%) compared to towns and villages (69%), among women (79%) compared to men (71%), among the young (78%) compared to the old (66%), among students (81%) compared to professionals (33%), and among supporters of Hamas (92%) compared to supporters of Fateh (69%)."[76]
The firing of rockets from Beit Hanoun into Israel was acceptable to about three quarters of the Palestinian public in the occupied territories, and was higher in the West Bank (78%) compared to the Gaza Strip (71%), among students (83%) compared to merchants (63%), and among supporters of Hamas (86%) compared to supporters of Fatah (73%). While firing rockets from Beit Hanoun was supported by a majority of Palestinians (75%), 59% of the residents of Beit Hanoun rejected this practice. 83% of Palestinians favored a mutual cessation of violence.[77]
A report by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center, a Palestinian organization, showing trends based on polls conducted since 1997, indicated that Palestinian support for military operations against Israeli targets stood at 34–40 percent in 1997–1999, climbed to 65–85 percent in 2000–2004, and dropped back to 41 percent at the end of 2004. "Military operations" were defined as including shootings, car bombs and mortar rocket attacks, but not suicide bombings.[78] A 2005 poll by the center indicated that 53 percent of Palestinians supported "the continuation of [the] Al-Aqsa Intifada, 50 percent supported "suicide bombings against Israeli civilians", and 36 percent supported "the resumption of military operations against Israeli targets".[79]
A 2004 study by Victoroff et al. was conducted on a group of 52 boys, all 14 years old, from the al-Shati camp in Gaza. Forty-three percent of the boys reported that a family member had been wounded or killed by the IDF, and half lived in households where the father's employment was lost following the outbreak of the Second Intifada. "Sympathy for terrorism" was found to be correlated with depression and anxiety scores, as well as with the level of "perceived oppression," and "emotional distress". Of those who felt subject to unjust treatment, 77 percent expressed sympathy for terrorism.[80]
A March 2008 report by Palestinian Center for Policy & Survey Research (PSR) noted that the level of support for armed attack against Israeli civilians inside Israel increased significantly with 67% supporting and 31% opposed, compared to support by 40% in 2005 and 55% in 2006. A February 2008 suicide bombing that killed one Israeli woman in Dimona was supported by 77% and opposed by 19%. An overwhelming majority of 84 percent supported the March 2008 Mercaz HaRav massacre, in which a Palestinian gunman killed eight students and wounded eleven in a Jerusalem school. Support for the attack was 91 percent in the Gaza Strip compared to 79 percent in the West Bank. Similar suicide attacks in 2005 had been less widely supported, with 29% support for a suicide attack that took place in Tel Aviv, and 37% support for another one in Beersheba.[81]
While comprehensive data on internal violence is unavailable, conservative estimates show at least 7,000–11,000 Palestinians have been killed in intra-fighting since the 1982 Lebanon War.[82]
| Conflict | Killed |
|---|---|
| Gaza War | 75 |
| Internal violence 2007–present | 600[83] |
| Battle of Gaza (2007) | 130 |
| Second Intifada | 714[84] |
| First Intifada | 1,100 |
| War of the Camps | 4,000–8,000 |
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